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WHAT TRIGGERS REVLON?
Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman*
INTRODUCTION
Delaware's new approach to takeover law is announced in three cases
that address different aspects of management's role in the standard
drama of defending against a hostile takeover. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Pe-
troleum Co.' scripts a main act for the drama by prescribing a duty to
compare the outsider's offer with the universe of other options and, if
necessary, to resist the outsider within the guidelines fixed by the propor-
tionality test.2 Moran v. Household International, Inc.3 writes a prologue
by encouraging management to plan a vigorous defense that can thwart a
coercive offer without damaging the company. Finally, Revlon Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings4 surveys the entire drama and supplies
an epilogue for occasions when the best interests of shareholders will no
longer permit the target to remain independent. Once the company's sale
has become "inevitable," Revlon decrees that resistance under the aegis
of Unocal's proportionality test must end.5 At this point, management's
duty shifts from canvassing alternatives to a sale to determining how the
sale should take place:
The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Rev-
lon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at
a sale for the stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the
board's responsibilities under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced
threats to corporate policy or effectiveness, or to the stockholders' in-
terests, from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive
measures becomes moot. The directors' role changed from defenders of
* Respectively, Professor of Law, Stanford University; and Professor of Law, Harvard
University. Gilson's research was supported by a grant from the John M. Olin Program in
Law and Economics at Stanford Law School and by the Hoover Institution, at which he was
a Visiting Scholar while much of this paper was written. Kraakman's research was sup-
ported by the Harvard Law School Faculty Summer Research Program and the Harvard
Program in Law and Economics, which is funded by the John M. Olin Foundation.
This article is part of a larger project examining Delaware law governing a corpora-
tion's sale. We wish to thank Melvin Eisenberg and Theodore Mirvis for helpful comments
on an earlier draft.
1. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
2. The proportionality test is stated as follows: "If a defensive measure is to come
within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the
threat posed." Id. at 955. See Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for
Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247 (1989).
3. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
4. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
5. Id. at 182.
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the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price
for the stockholders at a sale of the company.'
As the concluding case in the Unocal trilogy, Revlon is the most diffi-
cult and far-reaching of the trio. Revlon ties management's obligations
during a takeover attempt to a discrete event-the point at which a sale
of the company becomes inevitable-that is both ambiguous and com-
monplace, since its occurrence may be difficult to pinpoint in a hostile
takeover, and yet it must arise in every friendly acquisition. Within the
confines of defending against a hostile takeover, Revlon poses the prob-
lem of specifying precisely what action or decision finally trips the board's
duty to lay down its arms and discharge "the Revlon obligation to con-
duct a sale."8 Outside the setting of a hostile takeover, Revlon raises the
open-ended issue of what follows when the identical action or decision
occurs in the course of a friendly deal that does not respond to a hostile
bid.
The continuing volume of takeover litigation makes a precise specifi-
cation of which transactions or decisions trigger management's duties
under Revlon essential and inevitable. If Revlon is to regulate manage-
ment's actions effectively, courts and counsel must know when to instruct
directors to adopt their new roles. In addition, once Revlon's reach is de-
tailed this far, defensive planners will test its limits and force the courts
to articulate its reach even more precisely. From the planner's perspec-
tive, the prize of an independent-and perhaps even "unrestruc-
tured"-company will always remain within reach as long as the board's
actions are governed by Unocal's proportionality test. By contrast, when
Revlon is triggered, the board may no longer be able to select the com-
pany's buyer or even dictate the form of the transaction in which it is
sold. Thus, planners will continue to search for defensive transactions
that can block a pending hostile bid without triggering management's
Revlon duties.
Wherever Revlon's trigger is set in the course of defending against a
hostile takeover, moreover, the same trigger is likely to exist in other set-
tings as well. Consider the problem that Revlon poses for the legal plan-
ner seeking to protect a friendly acquisition from possible disruption by a
hostile offer. Without an effective lock-up device, Revlon's application
may be fatal to a friendly transaction, since it would presumably obligate
the target's board to accept a higher bid by an unwanted suitor. However,
the Delaware Supreme Court in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc.,9 recently extended Revlon's application by curtailing the planner's
freedom to craft an effective lock-up. A board can only favor one bidder
over another if it obtains a benefit that is reasonably related to the bid-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1338 (Del. 1987).
9. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
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ding advantage that it confers on its preferred suitor.'0
Thus, the nature of Revlon's trigger and its legal consequences are
critical planning concerns over a broad range of transactions. This article
anticipates Revlon's further development and proposes a doctrinal frame-
work for its application. We answer the threshold question-"What trig-
gers Revlon?"-by exploring two disparate settings that span the range of
circumstances in which the question matters: recapitalizations initiated
by management in response to a hostile bid, and negotiated third-party or
"friendly" acquisitions. In part I, a review of the case law arising from
defensive recapitalizations demonstrates that transactions trigger Revlon
only if they result in a transfer of control. In turn, analysis of Revlon's
application to friendly acquisitions in part II reveals the important issues
of legal policy that inhere in how the control test is defined. In both set-
tings, however, we argue that even when Revlon is triggered, target man-
agement retains its traditional autonomy to propose a fundamental
transaction, such as a recapitalization or a third-party acquisition without
initiating a formal auction as long as shareholders can freely reject man-
agement's proposal in favor of a competitive bid. Finally, part III con-
cludes with a conjecture about how the vulnerability of shareholders to
coercion-and with it, the likely content of Revlon's duties-might be
seen to vary systematically over a broader range of transactions.
I. REv.LoN's TRIGGER IN THE SETTING OF A HOSTILE BID: DOES THE
PROPOSED TRANSACTION RESULT IN A TRANSFER OF CONTROL?
We turn first to applying Revlon in the familiar setting of a defense
against a hostile takeover bid. It was in this context that transactional
pressure first forced the Delaware Supreme Court to announce the Revlon
standard and subsequently pushed the courts to develop the nature of
Revlon's trigger. Revlon itself reviewed a board's decision to frustrate a
hostile bidder by agreeing to a leveraged buyout by the company's man-
agers and an affiliated investment group. Approving this transaction re-
sulted in an inevitable "sale" of the company, in the terms used by the
Delaware Supreme Court, because the transaction was a formal sale. For
precisely this reason, however, defensive planners immediately sought to
avoid Revlon by means of transactions, which we term "management re-
capitalizations," that transferred control to management without requir-
ing public shareholders to dispose of their shares. These transactions
were functionally equivalent to management buyouts. Yet, because they
were not formal sales, one could argue that they merited review under
Unocal's proportionality test rather than under Revlon's potentially more
restrictive standard. The functional equivalence of management buyouts
and management recapitalizations thus became a critical planning tool
that forced the Delaware courts to delineate Revlon's trigger more
precisely.
10. Id. at 1288.
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A. Management Recapitalizations: The Transactional Crucible for
Forging Revlon's Trigger
The practical equivalence of management recapitalizations and man-
agement buyouts was never a secret. Their financial impact on sharehold-
ers was similar: Both transactions yielded shareholder gains of
approximately the same order of magnitude." Even more telling, it was
always apparent that management recapitalizations were carefully crafted
to shift a controlling interest to incumbent managers and their allies.2
What was not always clear, however, was that this evasion of Revlon's
duties through the device of formal recharacterization would eventually
fail. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court only recently concluded in the
Macmillan decision, almost without discussion, that Revlon applies to a
defensive recapitalization which transfers control to management." Be-
cause the Macmillan court's treatment of this issue was brief, it is useful
to review the history that preceded it.
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp. 4 was the first opinion
by the Delaware Supreme Court to construe Revlon's scope. Although
Ivanhoe seemed to support a narrow and formalistic construction of Rev-
lon's criterion for an impending sale, its significance was clouded by idio-
syncratic facts. Among other peculiarities, the transaction at issue in
Ivanhoe was not an ordinary management recapitalization, since
Newmont-the target company in the case-did not attempt to increase
the equity stake of its own management. Instead, Newmont defeated a T.
Boone Pickens' offer by agreeing with Consolidated Gold Fields PLC,
Newmont's largest shareholder, to pay a cash dividend that permitted
Gold Fields to increase its ownership to 49.7% by purchasing shares in
the open market (a "street sweep"). Although this agreement did not in-
crease management's equity stake, effective control was nonetheless
transferred to management by a standstill commitment that obligated
Gold Fields to limit its ownership to 49.9%, to limit its board representa-
tion to 40%, to support management's nominees for the remaining board
positions, and (prior to an amendment forced by the Chancery Court) to
refrain from transferring its stock to any third party who refused to be
11. See Kleiman, The Shareholder Gains from Leveraged Cash-Outs: Some
Preliminary Evidence. 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 46 (1988); P. Handa & A. Radhakrishnan, An
Empirical Investigation of Leveraged Recapitalizations: A New Takeover Defense Strat-
egy, Working Paper No. 480, Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institu-
tions, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University (July, 1988).
12. If the amount of stock owned by management prior to the transaction was insuffi-
cient to provide management the desired level of equity given the expected post-dividend
value of the stock, management control nonetheless might be assured by selling post-divi-
dend shares to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) whose trustees were members of
management. See Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D.
Del. 1988). Alternatively, management's stake might be increased by a pre-dividend grant of
stock options that could be exchanged for post-dividend stock. See Robert M. Bass Group v.
Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988).
13. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1285.
14. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
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bound by the commitment. 15 Because management and Gold Fields to-
gether held a majority of Newmont's outstanding stock, and because Gold
Fields could neither tender to a hostile acquirer nor initiate a proxy con-
test on its own, the transaction was no less effective than a management
buyout or recapitalization in guaranteeing management's continued
control.
The supreme court quickly disposed of the claim that Newmont's re-
capitalization should have triggered a Revlon obligation to entertain Pick-
ens' bid with an opaque comment:
Revlon applies here only if it was apparent that the sale of
Newmont was "inevitable." The record, however, does not support such
a finding for two reasons.
First, Newmont was never for sale. During the short period in
which these events occurred, the Newmont Board held fast to its deci-
sion to keep the company independent. Ultimately, this goal was
achieved by the standstill agreement and related defensive measures.
Second, there was neither a bidding contest, nor a sale. The only
bidder for Newmont was Ivanhoe. Gold Fields was not a bidder, but
wished to protect its already substantial interest in the company. It did
so through the street sweep. Thus, the Newmont board did not "sell"
the company to Gold Fields. The latter's purchases were from private
sellers .... Even though Newmont's declaration of the dividend facili-
tated the street sweep, it did not constitute a "sale" of the company by
Newmont. 6
While the court's conclusion is clear, its reasoning is not. Newmont was
kept "independent" only in the sense that control was not transferred to
a third party. From the perspective of the public shareholders, a shift in
control did occur: control was effectively transferred to management.
From this perspective, the chief distinction between the Newmont device
and Revlon's "sale" is that Newmont shifted control to management
without allowing its public shareholders to receive a premium.7
15. Id. at 1340. In response to a finding by the Chancery Court that the standstill
agreement was a breach of the target directors' fiduciary duty, the agreement was amended
to allow Gold Fields to tender into an any and all, fully financed hostile offer. Because the
supreme court held that the original standstill agreement did not breach any fiduciary duty,
the amendments, implemented only to cure a breach, were unnecessary. Accordingly, the
analysis in the text focuses on the terms of the original standstill agreement.
16. Id. at 1345.
17. In Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, we offered an explanation for the cursory
treatment of the Revlon issue in Ivanhoe that would not foreclose treating management
recapitalizations as triggering Revlon. We argued that the Delaware Supreme Court saw the
case as one in which Newmont management really was trying to avoid being caught between
two potentially coercive offers. On the one hand, the Ivanhoe offer was for only 42% of
Newmont's outstanding stock. Although the offer stated that Ivanhoe intended to acquire
all remaining shares for cash at the same price as the initial offer, it also stated "that no
specific second step transaction had been devised, and that there was no firm commitment
to do so." Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1139. As a result, the Court concluded that the Ivanhoe offer
was a two-tier offer "fit[ting] perfectly the mold of ... a coercive device." Id. at 1324.
On the other hand, Newmont management believed that Consolidated Gold Fields,
1990]
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Perhaps as a result of its cryptic reasoning, Ivanhoe did not resolve
the issue of Revlon's scope. The two recapitalization cases that followed it
were markedly less inclined to place decisive weight on the forms of the
transactions that they reviewed. In Black & Decker Corp. v. American
Standard, Inc.,18 American Standard opposed Black & Decker's hostile
offer with a recapitalization plan that would have increased manage-
ment's shareholdings from 4.8% to 23.9% and, together with an ESOP
created as part of the plan, would have permitted management to control
54.5% of the company's stock.19 In reviewing this accumulation of voting
power, the Black & Decker court first concluded that Revlon is triggered
when a target's board sponsors a sale of control during a control contest,
regardless of the form of the transaction that transfers control.2" After
determining that American Standard's recapitalization plan would
"amount to a sale" of the company, the court held that the American
Standard plan triggered management's Revlon duties.2
Black & Decker was soon followed by Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v.
Evans,22 in which the Delaware Chancery Court reviewed an early phase
of the same control contest that eventually led to the supreme court's
decision in Macmillan. The recapitalization plan at issue in Bass Group
would have shifted into management's hands only 39.2% of the outstand-
ing stock of a successor to the target company23 that is, a voting block
significantly smaller than the 54.5% that management would have con-
trolled under the Black & Decker plan. Plaintiffs' claim that this shift of
stock triggered Revlon was never decided because the Chancery Court
concluded that the proposed recapitalization was disproportional to the
threat posed by the hostile offer.2 4 Nevertheless, the court characterized
Newmont's largest shareholder with 26% of the outstanding stock, also posed a threat of
coercion. Gold Fields held its shares subject to a 1983 standstill agreement that limited Gold
Fields to a maximum holding of 33-1/3 %, but that terminated if any other party acquired
more than 9.9%. When Ivanhoe intentionally increased its holding to 9.95%, Gold Fields
became free to "cancel the 1983 standstill agreement and acquire control of the company
[presumably through market purchases], thus leaving the remaining shareholders without
protection on "back end." Id.
As such, Newmont's defensive tactic-financing a Gold Fields street sweep with a $33
per share special dividend that gave Gold Fields 49.9% of the outstanding stock subject to a
revised standstill agreement that limited Gold Fields' board membership to 40%-could be
justified as a careful effort to steer a path between the explicit or implicit coercion
threatened by both Ivanhoe and Gold Fields. Id. at 1343.
As it turned out, the Delaware Supreme Court distinguished Ivanhoe in precisely this
way. See infra note 19.
18. 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988).
19. Id. at 782.
20. Id. at 780-82.
21. Id. at 783-84. Black & Decker creatively distinguished Ivanhoe by noting that the
Ivanhoe court said the dividend was not a "sale" because all shareholders received it. Id.
22. 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988).
23. Id. at 1235. The actual plan was somewhat more complicated than this figure sug-
gests, since it would have split the target company into two entities yet awarded manage-
ment 39.2% of the equity in only one. Id.
24. Id. at 1238.
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the plan as a sale of control and broadly hinted that the plan would have
been held to trigger Revlon if the question had been reached.25 Thus,
Bass Group not only supported Black & Decker's holding that a manage-
ment recapitalization can trigger Revlon, but it also suggested a critical
extension of the position staked out by Black & Decker: The appropriate
focus of the Revlon inquiry is on whether a recapitalization results in the
"transfer of effective control," regardless of whether it transfers voting
control over an absolute majority of the company's outstanding stock."
The tension between the apparently narrow formalism of Ivanhoe
and the substantive analysis of control shifts in Bass Group27 was unmis-
takably resolved in favor of the control test by the Delaware Supreme
Court's recent Macmillan decision. The resolution came almost casually,
in the form of an explicit endorsement of the Chancery Court's earlier
dicta:
At a minimum, Revlon requires that there must be the most scrupulous
adherence to ordinary principles of fairness in the sense that stock-
holder interests are enhanced, rather than diminished, in the conduct
of an auction for the sale of corporate control. This is so whether the
"sale" takes the form of an-active auction, a management buyout, or a
"restructuring" such as that which the Court of Chancery enjoined in
[Bass Group].28
In short, Macmillan clearly holds that Revlon is triggered when a recapi-
talization imposes a change in control. While the court still speaks of
Revlon's trigger as a "sale," a shift in control is the only feature common
to the restructuring in Bass Group, the choreographed auction in Mac-
millan, and the original management buyout in Revlon. Precisely this
point was recently and emphatically made by Chancellor Allen in Para-
mount Communications v. Time, Inc.29 in the course of elaborating on
the preceding passage from Macmillan:
The legally critical question this case presents then involves when
must a board shift from its ordinary long-term profit maximizing mode
to the radically altered state recognized by the Revlon case in which its
duty, broadly stated, is to exercise its power in the good faith pursuit of
immediate maximization of share value. Surely, when as in Revlon itself
and other cases construing its command, most notably Macmillan, the
25. Id. at 1243. In dicta, the court observed that "[sluch a sale would arguably trigger
duties under Revlon." Id. This observation is even more noteworthy because Ivanhoe had
previously stressed the importance of a 50% voting block, in contrast to the 39.2% block in
Bass Group, for determining when a control transaction might trigger Revlon. For further
discussion, see Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1343.
26. Bass Group, 522 A.2d at 1243.
27. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
28. Id. at 1285. Macmillan distinguished Ivanhoe on its "special facts and circum-
stance .... Specifically, Newmont's management faced two potentially coercive offers." Id.
at n.35.
29. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989),
afl'd, Literary Partners, L.P. v. Time, Inc., (Del. Supp. 1989) (Lexis, States Library, Del.
file).
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board itself decides to enter a change in control transaction, it has
elected to enter the Revlon zone. But it now appears resolved that a
subjective disinclination to sell the company will not prevent that duty
from arising where an extraordinary transaction including, at a mini-
mum, a change in corporate control is involved. .... 30
B. The Implications of the Control Trigger for Defensive Strategy
In the context of responding to a hostile takeover, Revlon and Mac-
millan loom over the defensive planner's shoulder as a potentially serious
constraint on a target's leeway to propose a recapitalization or other
means of increasing its stock price without also incurring an obligation to
sell the company. The critical issue for the defensive planner, then, is
precisely what follows if a proposed recapitalization will-or will
not-transfer control of the target company for purposes of applying
Revlon.
When a defensive management recapitalization will result in a
change of control, the issue is whether invoking Revlon's auctioneering
duty also limits a board's discretion under Unocal's proportionality test
to propose alternatives to a hostile offer. Even those who take the propor-
tionality test seriously acknowledge that a board may appropriately offer
an alternative transaction to shareholders facing an outside offer.31 Yet, a
management recapitalization clearly triggers Revlon. Hence the question:
Does the norm of evenhandedness among competing buyers, which Rev-
lon requires in other contexts, conflict with a decision to offer sharehold-
ers the alternative of a management recapitalization?
The short answer can only be: As long as shareholders remain free to
choose between alternatives, the board actually facilitates an auc-
tion-and hence discharges its duty under Revlon-by offering sharehold-
ers an attractive alternative to an existing bid. The critical distinction is
between the board's freedom to offer shareholders an alternative and the
board's freedom to impose that alternative on shareholders. Any recapi-
talization transaction can be cast either in a form that may be imple-
mented on management's authority alone, as in Black & Decker and Bass
Group, or in a form that requires shareholder approval, whether by
tender or vote.
For example, the recapitalization in Black & Decker could have been
effected either through an issuer tender offer, (as in AC Acquisitions
Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.32 ), or through a charter amendment
requiring shareholder approval. The key difference is the presence or ab-
sence of shareholder choice. If shareholders can freely choose between a
recapitalization transaction and a hostile offer, then the proposed recapi-
talization is a permissible alternative under both Unocal's proportionality
30. Id. at 93,277.
31. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790 (Del. Ch. 1988); Gilson
& Kraakman, supra note 2, at 256-58.
32. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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test and Revlon. However, a recapitalization plan that shareholders can-
not vote to reject-even one that responds to an apparently unfair or co-
ercive outside offer-ought to trigger the board's duty under Revlon,
which in this context implies an effort by the board to allow shareholders
to make an unconstrained choice. In other words, Revlon implies that a
control transaction must be treated as a true alternative subject to share-
holder choice, rather than as a routine defensive measure subject to bal-
ancing by the board against the coercive features of an outside offer
under the proportionality test."
By contrast, when a proposed recapitalization will not result in a
transfer of control, the corollary of the Revlon control rule is that share-
holders cannot demand to choose between management's proposed trans-
action and a hostile offer as a matter of right. Here, the issue is whether
Revlon's control trigger allows the board too much flexibility to defeat a
hostile offer: Why should management be able to evade a shareholder
choice when it plans to massively restructure the company in response to
a hostile bid, regardless whether its proposal would result in a shift of
voting control?
One response might be that a target company can sometimes equal or
exceed the value of a hostile offer through a recapitalization. When the
business plan underlying the hostile offer projects financial rather than
operating gains-such as a post-acquisition strategy that contemplates in-
creased leverage and the sale of some lines of business-target manage-
ment can duplicate the strategy itself. Thus, Interco recently responded
to what it perceived as a leveraged bust-up takeover offer by proposing to
duplicate the core of its suitor's strategy. It planned to borrow some $2
billion, to sell assets generating approximately one-half of its gross sales,
and to distribute the proceeds-with subordinated debentures and pre-
ferred stock-to its shareholders as a dividend. This dramatic restructur-
ing, Interco claimed, would give shareholders the full profits that would
otherwise have been shared with the bidder if the hostile offer had
prevailed. 4
33. A more straightforward way of addressing when management should be able to
impose recapitalizations without shareholder approval is to frame the issue in terms of a
final period problem. A recapitalization that results in a change of control introduces a final
period in which management no longer confronts the same incentives to safeguard share-
holders interests. For a discussion of this issue, see infra note 68.
34. See City Capital, 551 A.2d at 787. As matters developed, Interco's claim was mis-
taken and shareholders would have been much better off with the hostile offer. See Sandler,
Interco Could Be a Black Mark for Wasserstein, Wall St. J., July 10, 1989, at C1, col. 3.
Note that the same approach is available to a board of directors when the proposed transac-
tion is a management buyout motivated by a financially-based business plan. The transac-
tion proposed by RJR Nabisco management contemplated selling the company's non-
tobacco businesses and using the proceeds, together with substantial borrowings, to repur-
chase the public's stock, and leaving management in control of a highly leveraged tobacco
company. As the RJR Nabisco board came to threaten, the company was capable of dupli-
cating that outcome by conducting the sales and making the borrowings itself, and by pay-
ing the proceeds to shareholders as a dividend, all of which would leave the highly leveraged
tobacco company in the hands of its shareholders rather than management.
1990]
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Yet, the mere fact that a recapitalization plan might benefit share-
holders relative to an outside offer does not distinguish Interco's plan
from the proposed recapitalizations in Black & Decker and Bass Group,
which now fall securely within Revlon's reach. An Interco-style "non-
management" recapitalization does not require Revlon's protection in ad-
dition to review under Unocal's proportionality test, despite the enor-
mous change that it works on the risk and return characteristics of
shareholder investments,35 because it leaves the company's incumbent
managers vulnerable to a future takeover even if they defeat the present
offer. As we have argued at length elsewhere,3 the threat of a future take-
over bid is an integral aspect of meaningful proportionality review. Even
if a company such as Interco can persuade a court that its proposed re-
capitalization is reasonable in relation to the threat posed by a hostile
offer, it will probably not retain its independence indefinitely if its man-
agement's promise to create shareholder value proves empty. By contrast,
a management recapitalization, like a management buyout, removes the
company from the reach of the acquisitions market once and for all.
Thus, unless shareholders can exercise a choice when the plan is pro-
posed, they are unlikely to have a second chance.
II. REVLON'S TRIGGER IN THE SETTING OF A FRIENDLY TRANSACTION:
WHAT CONSTITUTES A CHANGE IN CONTROL?
The second setting in which the planner confronts the specter of trig-
gering Revlon arises in structuring a friendly transaction. Can a company
agree to be acquired in what used to be the traditional manner-that is,
an agreement negotiated at arm's length calling for a form of transaction,
like a merger or sale of assets, that normally requires shareholder ap-
proval37-without shopping the transaction or otherwise conducting an
auction? Not surprisingly, it was in this context that the ambiguities in-
herent in the simple phrase "change in control" first emerged. Precisely
because both parties in a friendly transaction hope to avoid opening the
field to competitive bids, there is an incentive to cooperate in casting the
transaction in a form that does not trigger Revlon.
A. Background: The "Merger of Equals" Argument
The planners' initial response to this problem took the form of a
"merger of equals." Imagine that the boards of directors of two compa-
nies, which for sake of currency we can call Time and Warner, conclude
that a friendly merger is in the best interests of both corporations. The
transaction contemplates that the consideration for the merger will be
voting stock rather than cash. In addition, following the merger the share-
35. See R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 576-77 (1986).
36. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 271-73.
37. See, e.g., J. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER:L STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NE-
GOTIATING CoRPoRATE ACQUISITIONS (1975); Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:
Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
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holders of Warner, the disappearing company, will receive as much as
62% of the voting shares of Time, the surviving corporation.
The planner's dilemma is the application of Revlon. Because the
boards of the two companies believe that theirs is the best deal, neither
board has any interest in shopping the transaction. However, if Revlon
applies, both corporations will have an inchoate obligation to confirm that
the implicit price reflected in the merger's exchange ratio is, in fact, the
best price that can be obtained. Under such a duty, the planner's fear is
that an outside buyer will emerge to offer more than the price implicit in
the merger's exchange ratio, as valued by today's market, and thereby
effectively terminate board authority to pursue the merger, even though
both boards of directors believe in good faith that the outsider's price is
inferior to the value that the negotiated transaction would ultimately
yield in the future.
Efforts to protect friendly transactions from competition have taken
two forms. The first and broader effort was the claim advanced by Time
and Warner that Revlon does not apply to mergers of equals.38 In part,
this argument was essentially semantic. What triggers the shift in the
board's obligation under Revlon is the "recognition that the company was
for sale." 39 Only then does the board's duty change "from the preserva-
tion of Revlon as an entity to the maximization of the company's value at
a sale for the stockholders' benefit."40 However, a merger of equals, the
argument goes, is not a "sale" but a consolidation of two companies, in
which neither is a buyer nor a seller. The point of the argument is to alter
the legal standard that applies to the second form of protection for
friendly deals-the grant of lock-ups, leg-ups, break-up fees, privileged
access to data and other means to favor a friendly bidder and discourage
a competitive bidder. If Revlon does not apply, the standard of review
presumably is the undiluted business judgment rule. If Revlon does ap-
ply, any effort to protect the favored transaction by deterring the making
of a competitive bid is subject to Macmillan's formulation of the interme-
diate standard: The board must show that it obtained a benefit reasona-
bly related to the protection it provided the preferred suitor.
The argument that a merger of equals is not really a sale should re-
call a similar debate over the availability of pooling of interest accounting
in connection with an acquisition."1 An unfavorable accounting treatment
follows when an acquisition is deemed to be a "purchase" of one company
by the other and the target's price exceeds the market value of its identi-
fiable assets: good will is created to the -extent of the difference between
price and market value, and the depreciable bases of tangible assets are
increased to market value from their lower pre-transaction historical cost.
The acquiring company's subsequent accounting earnings are therefore
reduced to reflect amortization of the goodwill and the now higher depre-
38. Id.
39. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
40. Id.
41. See generally P, GiLsON, supra note 35, at 258-79.
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ciation charges.
By contrast, if the transaction is deemed a "pooling" of the two com-
panies, "groups of stockholders combine their resources, talents, and risks
to form a new entity to carry on in combination the previous busi-
nesses," 42 with the consequence that the two financial statements also
may be combined without reducing reported earnings. For twenty-five
years, the accounting profession has wrestled with identifying the charac-
teristics of a true pooling transaction; at the moment Accounting Princi-
ples Board Opinion No. 16 lists some ten factors.43 Yet, this result
satisfies no one, precisely because it turns on the intrinsic meaning of the
terms "pooling" and "purchase" rather than on the underlying issue of
when historical costs are appropriately replaced with current costs for ac-
counting purposes. 4
4
Thus, before the Chancery Court's opinion in Time, the debate over
Revlon's application to friendly transactions threatened to reach a similar
impasse over the intrinsic meaning of the term "sale." Time's emphasis
on "transfer of control"--on transactional substance rather than rheto-
ric-shifted the inquiry to its proper course. Nevertheless, as the litigants
in Time pressed upon the Chancery Court, the potential remains for an
equally convoluted debate over the meaning of "transfer of control": that
is, over the choice of a test for identifying control shifts.
B. What Constitutes a Change in Control?
Two different approaches to defining a change in control are possible:
a "voting power" rule and a "control block" rule. Either approach can be
defended by plausible doctrinal and policy arguments and, on first glance,
each appears to have a special advantage. Thus, the choice between these
rules initially may appear critical to Revlon's future development. In our
view, however, an examination of the assumptions underlying the voting
power and control block approaches indicates that each merely empha-
sizes a different aspect of a potential shift in control. Properly elaborated,
42. Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16, Paragraph 28 (1970).
43. Id.
44. Ironically, the recent Time-Warner transaction raised not only the issue of
whether a marriage of equals triggers the application of Revlon, but also the pooling/
purchase controversy. The original merger transaction was designed to meet Accounting
Principles Board Opinion (APB) No. 16's requirements for pooling of interest accounting to
avoid creating the substantial amounts of goodwill that would result if the transaction had
to be accounted for as a purchase. Interestingly, the substance of the transaction ultimately
proved a barrier to the desired accounting treatment. Whether as a means of assuring that
shareholders of both corporations would approve the merger, or as an option to deny a
hostile bidder access to the 85% acquisition exemption from the Delaware anti-takeover
statute (see infra note 54), the transaction contemplated that at either company's election
the companies would exchange a substantial amount of stock in order to place votes and
shares in friendly hands. Following the Paramount offer, the exchange was conducted. If the
transaction then had proceeded as a stock-for-stock merger, it appears that Paragraph 46 of
APB No. 16 would have prevented the transaction from being accounted for as a pooling.
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the control block test, favored by Chancellor Allen in Time,45 can capture
the advantages of both.
1. A voting power rule: the road not taken
A voting power rule is the road not taken by Chancellor Allen in
Time. Such a rule identifies changes in control on the basis of how much
a proposed transaction dilutes the voting power of shareholders in a tar-
get company. Under this approach, a transaction that leaves target share-
holders with less than 60%-or even 70% or 80%, depending on the
circumstances-of their pre-existing voting power would be likely to trig-
ger Revlon, just as a combination transaction triggers voting and ap-
praisal rights under a modern corporation statute when a constituent
company's shareholders retain less than 80% of the voting power in the
surviving entity. 4" The rationale for the voting power test is that a large
shift in a corporation's voting shares will likely be accompanied either by
a change in its ownership structure that creates or further entrenches a
control group, or by a material change in the identity of its management.
Unlike existing corporate combination statutes, 47 however, a Revlon vot-
ing power test need not be based exclusively on a fractional shift in vot-
ing power; it can also weigh the consequences of such a shift for the
ownership structure of the company or the continuity of its management.
Thus, in determining whether control of Time would have changed for
purposes of triggering Revlon as a result of the original Time-Warner
merger agreement, a flexible voting power test would focus not only on
the percentage of the surviving entity's stock held by former Time share-
holders, but also on the terms of the agreement allocating half the num-
ber of board seats in the survivor to former Time directors and assuring
the ultimate primacy of Time's officers in managing the combined
entity.48
2. A control block rule
In contrast to a rule based on changes in voting power, transfers of
control might also be identified by reference to a transaction's impact on
a company's control structure regardless of the percentage of shares
transferred. Here, the logical inquiry is whether a transaction shifts vot-
ing control to an identifiable party or group (such as management in
Black & Decker and Bass Group), or leaves it diffused among disaggre-
gated public shareholders whose particular identities may differ as a re-
45. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,277-80 (Del. Ch.
July 14, 1989), afl'd, Literary Partners, L.P. v. Time, Inc., (Del. Supp. 1989) (Lexis, States
Library, Del. file).
46. See, e.g., CALIF. CORP. CODE § 1201(b) (Deering Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 251(f)(3) (1974).
47. For examples of typical statutes, see supra note 46.
48. For a discussion of these provisions governing the future management of the sur-
viving entity under the original Time-Warner proposal, see Time, [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) at 93,270.
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suit of the transaction but who, because of the costs of collective action,
will remain unable to exercise effective control. Chancellor Allen appears
to have selected such a control block test in Time:
If the appropriate inquiry is whether a change in control is contem-
plated, the answer must be sought in the specific circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction. Surely under some circumstances a stock for
stock merger could reflect a transfer of corporate control ...But
where, as here, the shares of both constituent corporations are widely
held, corporate control can be expected to remain unaffected by a stock
for stock merger . . . [N]either corporation could be said to be acquir-
ing the other. Control of both remained in a large, fluid, changeable and
changing market.4
From a doctrinal perspective, such a case-by-case search for the for-
mation of control blocks has the advantage of focusing directly on the
entrenchment problem that motivates Revlon's application in the first
place. Although the Time-Warner merger would have diminished the
likelihood of a subsequent hostile transaction by increasing the size of the
surviving entity,50 only the formation of a stable control block could en-
tirely scuttle the prospects of target shareholders for capturing a takeover
premium in the acquisitions market.51 However, part of the price of the
control block test's case-by-case focus on entrenchment is the difficulty of
drawing meaningful lines. While a purely numerical voting power test
may appear arbitrary, a control block test is difficult to apply to transac-
tions that stop short of completely blocking shareholder prospects for re-
ceiving future control premiums.
Consider a continuum of possible transactions that might serve as a
threshold for triggering a control block rule. At one extreme is a transac-
tion that absolutely precludes a future premium for shareholders, such as
a recapitalization that entirely eliminates the equity interest of public
shareholders. At the opposite extreme is a transaction that modestly re-
stricts shareholder access to a future premium-for example, by increas-
ing the surviving entity's size as in Time's acquisition of Warner-but
which still leaves control of the company "in a large, fluid, changeable
and changing market."' 2 Between these extremes is a wide range of dispa-
rate transactions that increase the difficulty of a subsequent hostile take-
over without barring it completely. One illustration is the proposal in
Bass Group to place a 39.2% voting block in management hands, which
the Delaware Chancery Court and Supreme Court characterized as a con-
trol shift for Revlon's purposes.5 3 A second is the placement of a 15%
equity stake with a white squire who supports incumbent management
49. Id. at 93,279.
50. Id. at 93,280.
51. Theodore Mirvis first argued these points forcefully to us in his comments on an
earlier draft of this article. His analysis was especially prescient in light of Chancellor Al-
len's discussion of the change of control issue in Time.
52. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,280
53. Bass Group, 552 A.2d at 1243; MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1285.
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and whose holdings are large enough to bar a hostile bidder from qualify-
ing for the 85% exemption in Delaware's business combination anti-take-
over statute . 4 The obvious questions are: Where on this continuum of
transactions does a change in control occur? How much entrenchment
tips the balance and becomes, for purposes of Revlon, a change in
control?
The answer cannot be that a transaction must make a subsequent
acquisition premium for shareholders legally or factually impossible. We
know from Macmillan's favorable reference to Bass Group that a transfer
of only 39.2% to target management will effect a change in control.55 The
Bass Group transfer would have made a subsequent hostile offer both
difficult and very unlikely, but not-and this is key-impossible.
A more promising approach is to ask whether management, acting
without shareholder approval, grants "enough" voting power to any
blockholder to allow the recipient effective power to obstruct a hostile
offer. Revlon's focus is on management self-interest in control transac-
tions.5 A transfer of blocking power to a friendly third party raises pre-
cisely this specter. Once such a transfer occurs, control of the corporation
for purposes of Revlon no longer lies, as in Time, with "a large, fluid,
changeable and changing market. ' 57 At least descriptively, this is what
occurred in Bass Group.58
Thus, if the Bass Group transaction would have triggered a control
block test by transferring the effective power to block a hostile offer, how
do we analyze still smaller shifts of voting blocks under a control block
rule, such as those involved in Warren Buffet's new role as a white squire
for Salomon Brothers, Gillette, and USAir? In these transactions, issuers
have sold Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffet's investment vehicle, con-
vertible stocks that pay an unusually favorable dividend rate and convert
at an equally favorable rate into more than 10% of an issuer's voting
stock."' These transactions are clearly designed to deter hostile take-
overs.60 Although Berkshire Hathaway's holdings are too small to veto
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (a)(2) (1974 & Supp. 1988). Under this exemption, a
hostile bidder avoids the statute if it obtains 85% of the target's voting stock in the same
transaction in which it becomes an "interested shareholder" by obtaining 15% of the tar-
get's stock.
55. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1270.
56. Macmillan describes the justification for Revlon's intermediate standard of review
in precisely these terms: "[W]here issues of corporate control are at stake, there exists 'the
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than
those of the corporation and its shareholders.' For that reason, an enhanced duty must be
met at the threshold. ... Id. at 1287 (citation omitted).
57. Time, [ 1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,280.
58. To be sure, a party might also accumulate enough power to prevent a takeover
through private purchases or a street sweep conducted without management's assistance.
Without management's aid, however, there is no entrenchment motive and management is
not disabled from protecting shareholder interests.
59. See Sandler, Buffet's Savior Role Lands Him Deals Other Holders Can't Get,
Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1989, at C1, col. 3.
60. Id. While the terms of these sales reportedly do not restrict voting rights, they bar
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hostile takeovers through voting power alone (unlike the equity blocks at
issue in Bass Group or in Ivanhoe6 1 ), they are just large enough to deny a
bidder access to the 85% acquisition exemption in Delaware's business
combinations statute. Whether they are an effective deterrent, and thus
meet a control block test, depends on the effectiveness of Delaware's stat-
ute.62 Yet, if this strategy is effective, it should arguably trigger Revlon
under a control block test for precisely the same reason that Revlon
would have been triggered by management's block in the Bass Group
transaction: Management has placed a veto block in the hands of a
friendly supporter.63
3. Reconciling the control block and voting power rules
Stepping back from the interpretation of a control block rule, it is
apparent that this case-by-case focus on entrenchment is neither less am-
biguous nor necessarily more favorable to target management than a vot-
ing power rule. A broad range of transactions plausibly can shift critical
voting blocks to management or a white squire. The question, then, is
what is really at stake in selecting between a control block and a voting
power test.
The primary advantage of a control block test is its direct focus on
entrenchment-the very point of the Revlon standard. Properly elabo-
rated, the control block test picks up a range of entrenching transactions,
like those in Bass Group and small white squire placements, which might
involve issuance of too little voting stock to meet the necessarily arbitrary
Berkshire Hathaway from participating in acquisition offers and provide issuers with a right
of first refusal on any resale of their stock.
61. Recall that, according to Macmillan, the Ivanhoe transaction would have shifted
control absent the peculiar circumstances of conflicting coercive offers. See supra note 28.
62. For a discussion of Delaware's business combinations statute, see supra note 54
and accompanying text. The significance of the deterrence depends on the significance of
the burden created by the three-year moratorium resulting from the exemption's unavaila-
bility. We have argued elsewhere that the moratorium is substantially less burdensome than
may be commonly thought. See GiLSON & KRAAKMAN, 1989 SUPPLEMENT TO GILSON's THE
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 511-12 (1989). If we are correct, then it may
be a mistake to expect Buffet to forego a premium hostile offer; the offer would proceed
even without his participation and Berkshire Hathaway would be frozen in a minority posi-
tion for three years. To be sure, the issuer could still attempt to exercise its right of first
refusal if Berkshire Hathaway decided to tender, but that action would require justification
under Unocal and, in any event, would only finance a portion of the hostile offer. This
analysis suggests that Buffet not only received "deals other holders can't get," he also got
something for nothing by receiving a "whitemail" premium.
63. A question then arises as to the nature of Revlon's obligation in this context. For
example, Ivanhoe suggests an active target board role, speaking of "the Revlon obligation to
conduct a sale," 535 A.2d at 1338. Yet, Macmillan requires only that the target board justify
its favoritism as reasonable in relation to the advantage secured, conceivably allowing a
more passive role. With this approach, placing the defensive block would not trigger a re-
quirement that the company be auctioned, but only an intermediate level of judicial review
of the fairness of the terms of the block's sale. In a forthcoming article, we consider the
substance of the obligations that Revlon imposes when it is triggered: Revlon Refracted:
Business Judgment, Conflicts of Interest, and the Decision to Sell the Company.
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percentage set by a voting power test. 4
What may initially appear to be a secondary advantage of a control
block rule is illustrated by Time itself. The control block rule definitively
removed the aborted Time-Warner merger proposal from Revlon's reach,
just as it will presumably insulate many similar proposals for negotiated
mergers between public companies in the future. On our analysis, how-
ever, the advantage is illusory. Selecting a control block rule was unneces-
sary to safeguard the authority of Time's board to propose a friendly
merger. As we argue below, the content of Revlon's duties, properly un-
derstood, does not interfere with the established framework for negotiat-
ing a friendly merger or proposing it for shareholder approval."5 Even
more to the point, the merger proposal at issue in Time would not have
triggered Revlon even under a flexible formulation of the voting power
rule, since the Time-Warner agreement took great care to assure substan-
tial continuity of management for Time's shareholders in the governance
of the combined entity." Thus, a voting power rule and a control block
rule would have yielded an identical result in Time, and Chancellor Allen
was never confronted with the rules' divergent concerns.
A different set of facts-one in which control of the surviving entity
in a stock for stock exchange remains in the market while one company's
management bows out-illuminates the competing advantage of a voting
power rule: The rule is sensitive to major changes in corporate governance
which arguably merit Revlon's protections but which might escape the
application of a control block rule. When the management of a target
company relinquishes its authority by negotiating a shift of voting power,
it resembles a fiduciary who concludes a relationship of trust with the
beneficiaries of a trust estate, even though voting power is shifted to the
dispersed shareholders of an acquiring company rather than to a single
shareholder. The incentives of such a "departing" management differ dra-
matically from the incentives of new or continuing managers slated to
operate the combined entity. For example, consider the $200 million com-
pensation package assured to Steven Ross, the chief executive officer of
Warner, by the Time-Warner merger agreement.17 While Ross' compensa-
tion may well have been merited (and was in any case chiefly a threat to
64. So, for example, if a voting power rule set the limit at 60%, the transaction in Bass
Group would have squeezed by. Even under an 80% limit, most white squire transactions
would be protected regardless of their entrenching effect.
65. For a discussion of the control trigger for friendly transactions, see infra notes 69-
77 and accompanying text.
66. For a discussion of whether a flexible voting power test would trigger Revlon due
to the original Time-Warner merger agreement, see text accompanying supra note 48.
67. Apparently Time sought to assure Ross the value of his pre-existing compensation
arrangement with Warner, which, according to a 1988 proxy statement, may have been
worth up to $200 million over ten years. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 93,275. More generally, it should be noted that the division of authority between
Time's and Warner's officers, the date of Ross' proposed retirement, and Ross' compensa-
tion arrangements seem to have been the most difficult negotiating points in the Time-
Warner merger agreement. Id. at 93,269, 93,274-75.
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Warner's, not Time's, shareholders), it is hardly inconceivable that de-
parting managers in other transactions might be tempted to shortchange
their shareholders to secure more favorable employment or termination
provisions for themselves. Thus, when a departing management-or even
a management that will play a subordinate role in the combined en-
tity-proposes to transfer voting stock to an acquiring firm, it faces a
powerful conflict of interest in simultaneously negotiating the terms of a
merger for its shareholders and employment or settlement terms for
itself.
The voting power test is sensitive to the conflict of interest faced by
departing management because it is triggered, in effect, by target man-
agement giving up control in contrast to the control block test's focus on
whether a new group receives control. Since the proposed Time-Warner
merger neither shifted control of Time to a discernible group, nor shifted
those charged with managing Time's assets, Chancellor Allen was not
compelled to consider what a control block test might miss. However, if
the competing advantages of the two rules are understood in this manner,
then the benefits of a voting power rule can be secured with relative ease
within the framework of a control block test.
The key to reconciling the rules is to recognize that the conflict of
interest highlighted by a voting power test results from the fact that de
facto control of a public corporation without a controlling shareholder or
group resides with management. A friendly merger in which the owner-
ship of a constituent company remains diffuse but de facto control shifts
from one management team to another, is no less a control shift than a
transaction that gives rise to a control block. Although the absence of a
concentrated voting block lessens the hazard that shareholders may lose a
future acquisition premium, it does not reduce the danger that their in-
terests will suffer under the merger terms negotiated by their own man-
agement. And protecting shareholders against control shifts on terms
favoring management is precisely Revlon's charge.
Put in terms of a particular transaction, a decision by a target's
board to facilitate a tender offer for the target by a public acquirer is
clearly a decision to "sell" the company for purposes of Revlon, even if
the acquirer proposes to pay for the target with its own stock and thus
permits control of the target to remain "in the market." Under a flexible
control block rule, such a shift in voting rights to the dispersed share-
holders of the acquiring company is a de facto shift of control to the ac-
quiring company's management. The target board's decision in this case
should trigger Revlon not only because it may diminish the prospects of
target shareholders for receiving a subsequent acquisition premium, but
also because it creates an immediate conflict of interest that Revlon's du-
ties are intended to police. The public acquirer selected by the target's
board may simply pay too low a price. Precisely the same conflict, how-
ever, inheres in a stock-for-stock merger that contemplates the displace-
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ment or subordination of one management team by another."
These considerations suggest that the simple control block rule for-
mulated by Time is more likely to mark the beginning than the end of
serious inquiry into the circumstances under which control is transferred
for purposes of triggering Revlon. If the control block rule is to avoid
underinclusiveness and address the policy concerns of the voting power
test, it must be applied flexibly to accommodate the realities of de facto
shifts of control in transactions between widely held corporations. In ad-
dition, the control block rule will require elaboration even in the context
of entrenching transactions where it originates; much work remains to be
done in defining the circumstances under which management assistance
in forming or transferring a voting block constitutes a transfer of control.
Thus, it is predictable that the next round of the litigation game will fo-
cus on this element of Revlon's application.
C. The Implications of the Control Trigger for Friendly Transactions
Time's laudable focus on a transfer of control as Revlon's trigger still
leaves substantial room for debate over what constitutes a transfer of
control and over the application of that test to particular transactions. In
our view, however, the ultimate importance of much of this prospective
debate, in which we enthusiastically joined in the previous section, can be
averted by returning to the issue that underlies the scope and content of
Revlon's duties-the role of shareholder choice.
To see how a norm of shareholder choice guides Revlon's application
to friendly transactions, recall our earlier discussion of Revlon's applica-
tion to recapitalizations. 9 Although Revlon applies whenever a manage-
ment recapitalization would shift control over a target company, the
consequences of applying Revlon turn on the availability of shareholder
choice. The common characteristic of those management recapitalizations
that Revlon barred or arguably should have barred-i.e., those in Ivan-
68. There is a more general way to frame this argument. The principle that explains
why certain transactions require special protections or approval procedures, such as share-
holder votes, is the fact of a change in control. When management negotiates or approves a
transaction that reduces or eliminates its own participation in the firm, it creates what econ-
omists term a "final period problem." When two parties expect to engage in a series of
transactions, both sides have an incentive to behave fairly. Any cheating by a party in one
transaction will result in retaliation by the other party in the next transaction. In the last of
a series of transactions, however, this incentive for fair dealing disappears. Because transac-
tions that reduce or eliminate management's participation in the company create a final
period problem, they differ from all other transactions negotiated by management, and
should arguably be grouped with control transactions that require special protections or
approval procedures. For a discussion of control transactions in light of the final period
problem, see R. GILSON, supra note 35, at 575-80. The further implication that control trans-
actions require shareholder approval is developed in American Law Institute, Principles of
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations §§ 1.32, 6.01 (Discussion Draft No.
2, April 20, 1989). This analytical framework resolves the Revlon problem by reference to a
principle more general than the particular circumstances of the acquisitions market.
69. For a discussion of Revlon's application to recapitalizations, see supra notes 16-30
and accompanying text.
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hoe, Black & Decker, and Bass Group-was that management imposed a
change in control without the opportunity for shareholders to approve the
change by voting or tendering shares. In each case, the very form of the
transaction was designed to withhold from shareholders the opportunity
to choose; and in at least two of these instances, Revlon's application
thwarted a transaction that shareholders almost certainly would have re-
jected. By contrast, non-management recapitalizations that do not con-
template a shift of control over the company escape Revlon's implicit
requirement of an occasion for shareholder choice-even though they,
too, may ultimately fail judicial review under Unocal's proportionality
test if they limit shareholder choice too severely.70
Extending this framework to friendly transactions that conform to
the traditional model of an arm's length merger suggests that little neces-
sarily turns on whether Revlon applies. Shareholders always retain a
choice when a merger, sale of assets, or similar transaction threatens to
shift control: They can protect themselves by voting against an unfavora-
ble merger or, more realistically, by tendering their shares to a competing
bidder (such as Paramount in the Time-Warner transaction) when the
merger is so unfavorable that it attracts a competitive bid. Nothing in
Revlon requires a board to "shop" the company before agreeing to a
friendly acquisition. If shareholders can vote, a merger agreement readied
in the old-fashioned way-through good faith negotiations conducted at
arm's length-can only expand their options. Reading Revlon to require
something more would only jeopardize proposals that are already on the
table without offering shareholders an offsetting gain. The same point
may be made more sharply by observing that a merger proposal in today's
market invites an auction so clearly that nothing further is required to
satisfy Revlon's requirements.
On this view of Revlon's duties in the context of a friendly transac-
tion, whether Revlon was triggered would not have mattered to the proce-
dures by which the original Time-Warner merger was proposed. Revlon
happens not to have been triggered under the control block test selected
by Chancellor Allen, although the identical stock-for-stock merger would
"plainly" have resulted in a transfer of control-and, presumably, would
70. The leading recent example is the non-management recapitalization under review
in City Capital Associates v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988). In our view, Chan-
cellor Allen correctly declined to apply Revlon to Interco's dramatic recapitalization plan,
since that plan would not have resulted in a transfer of control. Nevertheless, Chancellor
Allen also enjoined Interco-again, correctly in our view-from using a poison pill to protect
the recapitalization (from the risk that shareholders would reject the recapitalization by
accepting the hostile tender offer) because it was a disproportionate response under Unocal.
An earlier case subject to the same analysis is AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton &
Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986). The point, once again, is that the highly coercive "non-
management" recapitalization proposed by Anderson, Clayton should not have been auto-
matically barred (since it did not shift control and Revlon did not apply). Nevertheless, the
plan was appropriately barred after review under the Unocal standard as disproportionate
to a non-threatening outside offer.
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have triggered Revlon-"if Warner were a private company." 71' Either
way, however, the ownership structure of Time's prospective merger part-
ner and the precise definition of a transfer of control should not interfere
with the freedom of Time's board to negotiate a friendly merger.
Of course, this conclusion will not comfort the planner who seeks to
protect a merger from disruption by a hostile bid after it is proposed.
Even if management can propose a friendly transaction to shareholders
without shopping the company regardless of whether Revlon applies,
management must still face the risk of a hostile bid. In terms of the
Time-Warner transaction, Revlon's irrelevance to the procedure by which
Time proposed its merger with Warner would have been of strictly aca-
demic interest to Time's management, so long as Time's shareholders re-
mained free to vote against the merger in order to tender to Paramount.
Here, then, is the real way that Revlon matters in the context of
friendly acquisitions: in determining how far management may go in at-
tempting to restrict shareholder choice. A finding that Revlon applies ob-
ligates management to seek the highest bid for the company. Under
Macmillan, this means that management cannot deploy a lockup or any
other device to favor its preferred transaction partner unless its efforts
are "reasonable in relation to the advantage sought to be achieved."72
That is, these efforts must be instrumental in securing the highest price
for shareholders.
By contrast, if Revlon does not reach a constituent corporation in a
merger, Macmillan's strictures do not apply. An attempt to favor the
merger transaction "over" the hostile offer would resemble a non-manage-
ment recapitalization for purposes of a Revlon analysis, and would thus
be left to scrutiny under the proportionality test insofar as it served as a
defensive tactic. A perfect example of this point is the "stock swap" that
was intended to fend off hostile interlopers in the original merger propo-
sal between Time and Warner. 3 If Revlon had been triggered by the
merger agreement, the associated stock exchange agreement would have
been vulnerable to a searching review under Macmillan. Because Chan-
cellor Allen determined that Revlon was not triggered, the stock swap
would have been subject to more textured review under Unocal's propor-
tionality test.74
71. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,279.
72. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288.
73. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,269-70.
74. The stock swap agreement also would have been subject to independent challenge
as a form of direct interference with the shareholder vote to approve the merger. Exchang-
ing shares before the shareholder vote is, in effect, stuffing the ballot box. Even apart from
Revlon and Unocal, Delaware courts strike down blatant interference with voting rights in
control contests. See, e.g., Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,965 (Del. Ch. 1988). To be sure, Chancellor Allen in
Time rejected the argument that restructuring the transaction to eliminate a shareholder
vote raised Blasius issues because the original vote was voluntary. Ironically, unfairly influ-
encing the outcome of a shareholder vote is a much more serious matter than cancelling
even a voluntary vote. Because a variety of important collateral consequences flow from
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Similarly, in our view there should never have been any question that
the Unocal test governed Time's attempt to defeat Paramount's hostile
bid by making its own friendly tender offer for Warner. As Chancellor
Allen held, Time's new offer for Warner left Time's management in place
and left control of Time securely in the hands of Time's shareholders.
Thus, obligations under Revlon or Macmillan were not triggered under
either a voting power or a properly elaborated control block measure of a
transfer of control.75 Nevertheless, if the new offer was not a control
transaction from the perspective of Time's shareholders, it remained a
response to Paramount's hostile offer. For this reason, it was still required
to pass muster under Unocal's proportionality test. That is, the court was
required to find that it was reasonable in relationship to the threat posed
by Paramount's offer.7 1
In short, the significance of triggering Revlon in the context of a
friendly transaction is largely restricted to Macmillan's ban against un-
warranted lockups or other pre-planned efforts to avert a competitive bid.
Revlon matters in arm's length deals because Macmillan matters. Beyond
this, as long as the constituent corporations in a friendly transaction do
not deploy defensive tactics or lockups, an auction will take care of itself.
In all likelihood, a competitive bid will emerge to challenge any friendly
transaction that is so unfavorable to one of its parties that a court would
be tempted to bar it after evaluating its terms.77 The acquisition market
is an exacting judge of fairness when allowed to function freely.
III. CONCLUSION: REVLON's UNCHARTED REGION
In this article, we have explored a general rule that Revlon should
apply whenever a proposed transaction would shift control over the com-
pany and examined its application in two important transactional set-
tings. In both settings, we argue that the consequences of applying Revlon
are not nearly as draconian as many have feared. In the standard setting
of a defense against a hostile takeover, we conclude that Revlon allows
management to offer shareholders any alternative including a manage-
ment recapitalization plan. Once a bid is on the table, target company
shareholders can only gain from the introduction of new offers that might
shareholder approval of a transaction (for example, its ratification effect), rigging even a
voluntary vote should be barred.
75. For further discussion of these triggers, see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying
text.
76. A peculiarity of the Time-Warner transaction was that Paramount could not have
completed its hostile offer for Time before Time completed its offer for Warner. Thus, the
court was not forced to pass on the reasonableness of Time's defensive tactics but only on
its continued pursuit of its plan to combine with Warner. A pointed footnote indicates that
the court's analysis under Unocal might have been different had it been required to rule on
Time's poison pill. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,284 n.22.
77. The claim is not that making a competitive bid involves no transaction costs.
Rather the point is a comparative one. Judicial valuation is a notoriously inexact science.
Our point is only that by the time the negotiated terms are so unfair that a court would set
them aside, the gap would exceed the transaction costs of making a competitive bid.
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transform a lone bid into a bidding contest. Similarly, in the friendly set-
ting of an arm's length negotiated deal, there is no need to require man-
agement to shop the company beforehand; the announcement of a merger
or similar transaction will itself attract sufficient attention from the ac-
quisitions market to assure that a successful deal is likely to be a fair one.
The only requirement that Revlon and Macmillan impose in both set-
tings is that shareholders must retain the freedom to choose between
management's preferred transaction and a competing offer. This opportu-
nity may be an uncoerced option to tender to a hostile bidder or an op-
portunity to vote down management's proposal. In either case,
management cannot restrict shareholder choice by erecting defensive tac-
tics or lockups without intermediate level judicial review then substitut-
ing for shareholder choice as a check on the fairness of management's
action.
Our analysis of these two contexts, however, does not exhaust the
transactions to which Revlon and Macmillan apply or the content of the
resulting duty. In particular, we have not considered management
buyouts or recapitalizations that are undertaken on management's own
initiative, outside the competitive setting of a hostile takeover attempt.
Nor have we addressed negotiated transactions that fall midway between
management buyouts on the one hand and arm's length deals on the
other. For example, transactions in which management favors a buyer
that is clearly unable to operate the company without management's co-
operation, even if the terms of the acquisition make no explicit provision
for transferring an equity stake to management.
In these highly (or even moderately) self-interested transactions, it is
far less certain that Revlon's promise of shareholder choice is adequately
protected by the mere possibility that an unfair transaction might be
challenged by an outside bidder. Management that initiates a self-
interested transaction enjoys several critical advantages, including access
to non-public information and the discretion to time its bid, that no out-
sider may be able to match. If management's offer is the only bid on the
table, it is pointless to suggest that the possibility of unconstrained share-
holder choice will adequately protect shareholder interests. For these rea-
sons, we conjecture that there is a missing piece in Revlon's puzzle that
the doctrinal framework developed in this paper does not yet supply: the
link between the content of target management's duty when Revlon ap-
plies and the degree of management self-interest in a control transaction.
It was unnecessary to confront this lacuna in the two transactional set-
tings considered here because, by hypothesis, the extreme threat to share-
holder choice only arises when management transactions are both self-
interested and proactive. The next step in our analysis of Revlon's duties
will be to supply the missing piece of the puzzle by constructing an ex-
panded framework that explicitly addresses the problem of management
self-interest.
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